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THE GITKSAN-WET'SUWET'EN
AS 'PRIMITIVE' PEOPLES
INCAPABLE OF HOLDING
PROPRIETARY INTERESTS:
CHIEF JUSTICE McEACHERN'S UNDERLYING
PREMISE IN DELGAMUUKW
B. Douglas Cox*
For over 100 years, British Columbia has refused to negotiate
land claim settlements with any of the aboriginal peoples living there.
This refusal has not been due to a lack of demand and persistance on the
part of the aboriginal peoples. In the case of the Gitksan and
Wet'suwet'en,1 attempts to obtain recognition of their rights of ownership and authority over their territory2 date back to 1884. 3 In the face
of the Provincial and Federal Governments' refusal to act, the Gitksan
finally turned to the courts to gain their long-asked-for recognition. This
was indeed a last resort- an admission that the issue could only be settled
in the 'white man's' court.
In May of 1987, the Gitksan entered the Canadian legal system
to seek justice. It was an unprecedented opportunity for Chief Justice
McEachern of the British Columbia Supreme Court to find a just and
lawful process to place the Gitksan within the context of Canada. Almost
four years later, the Chief Justice handed down his "Reasons for
Judgement" in Delgamuukw et al. v. The Queen (8 March 1991).4 The
decision in Delgamuukw was a stunning disappointment. The Chief
Justice concluded that according to Anglo-European law the Royal
Proclamation of 1763 does not apply in British Columbia and that any
sovereignty,jurisdiction, or title the Gitksan may have, which he says is
next to none, has in any case been extinguished. Indeed, according to the
decision, the Gitksan have no land-based aboriginal rights at all. 5
The question of whether aboriginal title is proprietary is indeed
an important one. The above conclusions were reached with much less
effort and rationalization than would have been the case had Chief
Justice McEachern found the Gitksan to possess proprietary rights in
their territory. Aboriginal rights as non-proprietary in nature are much
less capable of holding their own against the proprietary rights asserted
by settlers and governments. Further, it is much easier, both psychologically6 and legally, for non-proprietary rights to be lost by implication
than it is for a proprietary right. With a finding of this sort having this
amount of significance, it is surprising that Chief Justice McEachern
came to the conclusion in the manner he did. That is, he went to great
lengths to construct a 'screen'7 through which a vast amount of evidence
and legal precedent was sifted.
This paper will begin with a description of the very divergent
views that aboriginal peoples and Western society have of the world and
how this in turn affects their property systems. I will then analyse how
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Chief Justice McEachern, through a Western view of the world and,
specifically, the view that the Gitksan are a 'primitive' people, constructed a screen of judicial bias. I will also analyse the final ingredients
of the sifting process and raise serious questions as to whether Chief
Justice McEachern's findings oflawwere based on relevant and accurate
findings of fact. In other words, his method of finding fact and selecting
legal precedent will be examined to determine the validity of the finding
that the Gitksan do no not possess proprietary rights.

Two Diametrically Opposed Views of the World: Which View of
Property Emerges?
To understand the property concepts of any society, one must
have some appreciation of the philosophical premises that are basic to
the society's culture- the premises that a society uses to relate to the
world.
Within the cycles of the Gitksan existence, there is a continuum
among human beings, animals, and the spiritual world. 8 The Gitksan
believe that both human beings and animals when they die have the
potential to be reincarnated, if the spirit is treated with the appropriate
respect. 9 The Gitksan society is made up of both human beings and
animals who have the intelligence and power to influence the cyclical
path oflife. The events of the 'past' are not simply history; rather, they
are as much a part of the present and the future.10
This is unlike Western society, where the path oflife is largely
seen as linear with an occidental concept of time. Time is conceptualized
as a straight line with that which is behind being seen as the past, that
which is ahead being seen as the future, and that in the immediate
surroundings being seen as the present. Once a unit of time flows past,
it is never to be recaptured- it is gone forever.11
The Western world and the world of the Gitksan are based upon
two very divergent premises. These in turn underpin each of their
institutions, with one of the end results being two very different systems
of property.12 The Anglo-European system of property is vertically and
hierarchically linear. It is also singular in that it focuses upon the
individual's ownership of land. An underlying goal of the system is to
facilitate transferability of different property interests. This system
necessitates a detailed and expansive registry and documentation system to record and trace owners. If one went back far enough for any piece
of land, one would find the source of title in the Crown.13
Quite the opposite is the aboriginal or, specifically, the Gitksan
view of property. For them, the source oflife and, hence, property 'title'
(to borrow from common law terminology), is the Creator.14 Central to
their society and property system is the House.15 Each House is linked
to its territory through acts of connection (for example, touching a cane
to the land), pole-raising feasts, songs, and crests.16 These acts filter
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through the overall territory to strengthen the network of human
relations between Houses.
The Gitksan's world view causes their institutions to be nondiscrete. That is, their political, economic, spiritual, legal, social, ceremonial, educational, and proprietary institutions are interconnected
and simultaneously perform a multiplicity of functions.17 This is done
most widely through their Feast System.18 In the property sense, the
Feast is the nexus of the management of credit and debits, the legal
forum for witnessing the transmission of chiefs' names, and serves as the
·means for public delineation and confirmation of territorial and fishing
sites in the names of hereditary chiefs. Public recognition of title and
authority before an assembly of other chiefs affirms in the minds of all
both the legitimacy of successors to the name and the transmission of
property rights.19 As the proprietary representative of the House, the
chief has a range of duties concerning the allocation and disposition of
rights to use the territory amongst House and non-House members. The
chief also 'manages' the resources of the land and defends the territory's
integrity against clans of other House groups or Nations.20
As was indicated by the hereditary chiefs Opening Address to
Chief Justice McEachern, there was much evidence adduced at trial
which illustrated Gitskan 'law'.21 Though the Gitksan do not divide up
their laws and the administration of such laws in the manner of
Canadian law, the evidence adduced can nonetheless be seen as paralleling such common law divisions. 22 Despite such parallels being argued
at trial, Chief Justice McEachern failed to see them so clearly.
What the Gitksan did not expect was the Chief Justice's
persistance in following the tendency of lawyers, judges, and Canadian
society in general to look at aboriginal societies using a Western view of
the world. As Michael Asch has stated by quoting Marvin Harris:
The belief that one's own patterns of behavior are always
natural, good, beautiful or important and that strangers,
to the extent that they live differently, live by savage
inhuman, disgusting or irrational standards.23
This way of thinking is referred to as ethnocentrism and is generally
considered to be unfounded, invalid, and, hence, fallacious.24
In fact, this ethnocentrism was the foundation upon which Chief
Justice McEachern's 'screen' of filtration was constructed. He operated
on the assumption that aboriginal societies exist at an earlier stage of
evolutionary development than the Western World and that aboriginal
peoples are 'primitive'. The danger of projecting such a view onto
aboriginal land claim cases was seen clearly in Delgamuukw. The Chief
Justice misunderstood and distorted the Gitksan way oflife and culture
into shapes and concepts contrary to the Gitksan society's very essence.
If what Asch says is true,25 the findings of fact and, hence, findings of
law of ChiefJustice McEachern are put in serious doubt. Specifically, his
finding in law that the Gitksan's rights in the territory are nonproprietary is questionable. This causes his whole decision to be ex-
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tremely suspect since the remainder of his analysis is premised on this
finding.

Judicial Bias of Chief Justice McEachern
A. Personal Background and Bias of Chief Justice McEachern
It could be argued that Chief Justice McEachern is a member of
the Canadian judiciary just doing what any other judge would have done
if confronted with the same scenario as the Gitksan claim. The fundamental error in such an argument is that, let alone the selective and
erroneous use of law and selective use of evidence, Chief Justice
McEachern carries with him his own past, experiences, biases, and
values.26
Chief Justice McEachern was born and raised in British Columbia. He received all ofhis education and practiced law exclusively within
that province.27 His exposure to aboriginal people began in his formative years (1940s), when the view of aboriginals was even more negative
and stereotypical than it is today. A substantial portion of his exposure
to aboriginal peoples has likely been to the skid-row aboriginals of
downtown Vancouver and the extreme cases which came before him in
the criminal context. Though some would argue that he was simply
stating and using the Anglo-Canadian societal views of aboriginal
peoples, it is not unlikely that Chief Justice McEachern truly believed
the words he wrote in Delgamuukw.28
In 1983, Chief Justice McEachern sat on the Canadian Judicial
Council Inquiry Committee which examined the conduct of five Nova
Scotia Judges in the Donald Marshall case. In 1986, he decided a case
involving the litigation by an aboriginal band against the C.N.R.29 Even
in light of such past experiences, the Chief Justice personified the
Canadian legal system as an institution with very little knowledge of and
relevant experience with land claims and other complex aboriginal
issues. As Louise Mandell has said:

Judges have a greater responsibility than other professionals to understand Indian world views and property
definitions ....Yet in general, judges have no better knowledge than the general public and arguably, as a group,
they suffer from a somewhat poorer exposure to the dayto-day life and struggle of the Indian Nations.30

TheDelgamuukw decision is strong support for such an argument.
In his decision in the Donald Marshall Inquiry, Chief Justice McEachern
has been quoted as saying that the judiciary's right to speak out is "one
of the prices society pays for ajudiciary which says what it thinks should
be said."31 But like Donald Marshall Jr. who paid a great price, it was
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the Gitksan in this case who bore a heavy cost for which they were not
liable. This cost, which included a continued disregard and disrespect for
the aboriginal peoples of Canada was generated through the grave
errors of the Chief Justice.

B. Bias, Ignorance, Misconception, and Ethnocentrism
1. The Emergence of the 'Primitive' Premise
In terms of the Delgamuukw decision itself, the bias and misunderstanding that is too often seen in the Canadian judicial system could
lead to the Gitksan being viewed in Western world terms. This in turn
formed many of the underlying premises in the judgement. The Chief
Justice sifted the evidence and the law so as to substantiate his conclusion that the Gitksan's aboriginal rights are non-proprietary. The main
and critical premise was that the Gitksan are 'primitive'.
The first indication of this premise occurred very early in the
Reasons for Judgement, when the Chief Justice said:
... it would not be accurate to assume that even precontract existence in the territory was in the least bit
idyllic. The plaintiffs' anscestors had no written language, no horses or wheeled vehicles, slavery and starvation was not uncommon, and there is no doubt ... that
aboriginal life in the territory was, at best, "nasty,
brutish, and short."32
The underlying sense of superiority in this statement has powerful implications not only in its devaluation of aboriginal societies as
'primitive', but consequently in terms of territorial claims as well. 33 A
legal theory like this one, which is so ethnocentric, cannot be a valid one,
especially in light of such vast amounts of evidence to the contrary. 34 As
suggested by Mr. Justice Hall in his dissent in Calder et al. v. The A.G.
of B. C., this is a danger in the legal realm:
The assessment and interpretation of the historical documents and enactments tendered in evidence must be
approached in the light of present day research and
knowledge disregarding ancient concepts formulated when
understanding of the customs and culture of our original
people was rudimentary and incomplete and when they
were thought of to be wholly without cohesion, laws,
culture, in effect a subhuman species. 35
Despite warning from the highest court of the land, ChiefJustice
McEachern proceeded to perpetuate this false and destructive perception of the Gitksan as 'primitive'.
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2. Legal Precedent Chosen to Perpetuate this Premise
This 'primitive' people premise arose in the analysis of the first
requirement for establishing a claim for aboriginal rights and permeated
the entire decision.36 In accepting the four-part test of Mr. Justice
Mahoney of the Federal Court in Baker Lake as the road map for
aboriginal claims, and the antiquated case ofRe SouthernRhodesia37 as
strong authority, Chief Justice McEachern perpetuates ethnocentrism
and the 'primitive' people premise.
The first part of the Baker Lake test, namely that the claimants
and their ancestors be from an organized society, was required to
establish "an aboriginal title cognizable at common law."38 In deciding
this issue, the Chief Justice quotes a passage from Re Southern Rhodesia, which he felt had 'much wisdom':
The estimation of the rights of aboriginal tribes is
always inherently difficult. Some tribes are so low on the
scale of social organization that their usages and conceptions ofrights and duties are not to be reconciled with the
institutions or the legal ideas of civilized society. Such a
gulf cannot be bridged. It would be idle to impute such
people some shadow of the rights known to our law and
then to transmute it into the substance of transferable
rights of property as we know them. In the present case
it would make each and every person by a fictional
inheritance a landed proprietor 'richer than all his tribe'.
On the other hand, there are indigenous peoples whose
legal conceptions, though differently developed, are
hardly less precise than our own. When once they have
been studied and understood they are no less enforcable
than rights arising out of English law. Between the two
there is a wide track of much ethnological interest ... "39
Michael Asch has commented that the Delgamuukw case is not
only replete with this ethnocentric view of aboriginals, but the precedent
it relies on is also filled with similar error.40 The combination of the
Baker Lake test and Re Southern Rhodesia exudes the belief that
Western civilization is at the top of civilization and that the primitive
nature of aboriginal society will be measured against this benchmark of
superiority. It further suggests a misconception about aboriginal culture
and society. Using an approach such as this to establish and interpret
the Gitksan property system necessarily precludes accurate findings of
fact and law.
As a small gesture ofacknowledgement, ChiefJustice McEachern
passes the Gitksan claim on this first requirement of Baker Lake. He
adopts the words of Mr. Justice Mahoney:
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... the relative sophistication of the organization of any
society will be a function of the needs of its members,
[and] the demands they make ofit.41
However, he qualifies this by saying:
I am quite unable to say that there was much in the way
of pre-contact social organization among the Gitksan or
Wet'suwet'en simply because there is so little evidence. 42
Implicit in this statement is his view that the Gitksan are
'primitive'.43 The Chief Justice supported his views by using historical,
written records and opinions produced by the colonial regime and
rejecting vast amounts of oral histories and anthropologic evidence
adduced by the Gitksan. It should be noted that he did not reject the
evidence adduced by the Gitskan outright. ChiefJustice McEachern was
very liberal in admitting evidence, but made it an academic exercise by
giving the Gitskan evidence very little weight, if any at all at the end of
the day.44

C. Choosing Evidence
1. Anthropological/Oral versus Written History

As Chief Justice McEachern said: "Indian culture ... pervades the
evidence at this trial for nearly every word of testimony, given by expert
and lay witness, has both a factual and cultural perspective."45 Having
noted this, he continues: "When I come to consider events long past, I am
driven to conclude, on all the evidence, that much of the plaintiffs'
historical evidence is not literally true."46 In essence, Chief Justice
McEachern disregards much of the Gitksan culture, an act fatal to
understanding the Gitksan property system which is so interwoven with
its culture. In turn, this was fatal for the Gitksan case because their
evidence was largely in the form of oral and anthropologic works-both
of which the Chief Justice viewed with much scepticism.
When it came time to choose between the oral and anthropologic
evidence of the Gitksan and written historical documents produced by
the province, the Chief Justice felt the choice was obvious. While
explicitly disregarding the anthropologists as "add(ing) little to important questions that must be decided in this case"47, Chief Justice
McEachern held the historical written evidence as undisputable. He
said: "I accept just about everything they put before me because they
were largely collectors of archival, historical documents .... Their marvellous collections largely spoke for themselves."48 .
Not only did Chief Justice McEachern refuse to accept the
anthropologic evidence, which in large part was based on oral statements of the Gitksan, but he also discounted the direct oral evidence of
lay witnesses. As suggested earlier, the Gitksan way oflife, culture, and
property are all interconnected with their society operating on the
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spoken word. They have no need for the written form. However, the
Chief Justice was sceptical of such evidence from the very outset. For
example, he allowed the 'usual' opening statement by two hereditary
chiefs, but did so in a disrepectful manner by finding it "legally
embarassing"49. Later in the Opening Statement when one witness,
Chief Mary Johnson, was relating her part of the ada'ox, 50 she came to
a part which called for her to sing. It was part of her history. As described
by an observer, "the judge seemed quite upset and was not going to let
her sing. "51 The Chief Justice was quoted in the media as saying: "I have
a tin ear ... so it's not going to do any good to sing it to me ... this is a trial,
not a performance."52 Johnson proceeded anyway, with a three minute
song in the Gitksan dialect. The Chief Justice also did not hold the
Gitskan oral tradition and, hence, oral evidence in great esteem:
I am satisfied that the lay witnesses honestly believed
everything they said was true and accurate. It is obvious
to me, however, that very often they were recounting
matters of faith which have become fact to them. If I do
not accept their evidence it will seldom be because I
think they are untruthful, but rather because I have a
different view of what is fact and what is belief. 53
Though the Gitksan showed absolute respect for ChiefJustice McEachern
and the judicial system54 from the very outset of the trial, he did not
reciprocate.
By discounting such oral evidence, which went a long way to
establishing a property system, Chief Justice McEachern could not have
made any clearer his disrespect and misunderstanding of the Gitksan.
The Gitksan came to court and revealed their innermost beliefs and
values in a forum very foreign to them, but for which they showed great
respect. Yet, after hearing the massive amounts of oral testimony by the
Gitksan, Chief Justice McEachern concluded that they have a "romantic
view"55 of the world and, hence, did not give great weight to their
evidence. He attempted to rationalize this by saying that he had to
"assess the totality of the evidence in accordance with legal, not cultural,
principles."56 As explained above, though, his cultural values underpin
the entire decision.
It is peculiar that Chief Justice McEachern viewed the oral and
anthropologic evidence with such scepticism while holding the historical
written work as undisputable. By doing so, he suggested that if what the
Gitksan had to say had been written down at the time of each event of
history, they would have had a rock solid case. 5 7 ChiefJustice McEachern
strongly criticized the anthropologists' evidence as being non-credible
and unreliable due to the expert witnesses becoming "too close to their
clients"58 and losing their objectivity as a consequence. He continued to
state that their findings, though based on "honestly held biases", 59 were
still non-believable.
At the end of the day, he believed neither the expert anthropologists nor the lay witnesses. This is an interesting finding in light of
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Calder, where Mr. Justice Hall of the Supreme Court of Canada had no
problem with anthropologic evidence and, on the question of credibility,
he quoted the trial judge as saying he felt all witnesses
evidence
with total integrity and there was no issue of credibility. 0 Further, in
R. v. Sparrow,61 the Supreme Court of Canada did not take issue with
anthropologic evidence adduced at trial by the Musqueam Band with
respect to an aboriginal right to fish.
2. Select Historical Writings Relied Upon
A significant inconsistency and error in ChiefJustice McEachern's
judgement was his failure to look at the other evidence adduced in
Delgamuukw with the same scepticism as he looked at the anthropologic
and oral evidence. He took at face value the writings of colonial settlers
such as Brown, Loring, and Trutch, assuming they were objective
because they had been written prior to litigation62 by unbiased, removed parties.
In the case of trader William Brown, the Chief Justice says:
... trader Brown filed numerous reports which are a rich
source of historical information about the people
(Gitksan) .... I have no hesitation accepting the information contained in them. 63
Based on Brown's evidence, he further strengthens and perpetuates his
'primitive' view of the Gitksan by concluding:
... it would be incorrect to assume that the social organization which existed was a stable one. Warfare between
neighboring or distant tribes was constant, and the
people were hardly amenable to obedience to anything
but the most rudimentary form of custom. Brown held
them in no high esteem ... 64
He further uses Brown to support his disbelief in the House system:
It is significant that trader Brown does not mention
Indian Houses in his records. He seems to use the term
tribe, band, clan and family interchangably, or perhaps
imprecisely, but I am left in considerable doubt about
the antiquity of the House system. 65

ChiefJustice McEachern also places significance on the fact that
Brown doesn't mention the Feast System, particularly as a legislative
body. 66 The end result is that by accepting Brown's evidence with such
authority, the Chief Justice in one clean swoop strengthens his 'primitive' premise in addition to discounting the House and Feast Systems of
the Gitksan. How one colonial settler could carry such weight as to
overwhelm the enormous amount of evidence adduced by the Gitksan is
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puzzling. This is especially so when one looks to see who Brown really
was and why the Chief Justice failed to attach scepticism to his records.
Chief Justice McEachern attaches no relevance to the fact that Brown
served with the Hudson's Bay Company and was responsible for expanding the fur trade, a job which did not entail an understanding of the
aboriginals of the territory. Another colonial settler whose evidence was
used with the utmost respect and belief was Agent R.E. Loring, an
'Indian Agent' appointed by Canada at the request of the province. Chief
Justice McEachern selects and accepts many excerpts from Loring's
annual reports. He accepts Loring's words describing the Gitksan as a
"society in transit, a society of 'heathens' - such as eating dogs and
potlatching."67 The Chief Justice uses Loring's evidence to help conclude that the Gitksan social structure was not indeed what the Gitksan
made it out to be.68
Though there are many other examples, the last one cited here
is the use of the historical documents prepared by Mr. Trutch, the then
Commissioner of Lands and Works and Surveyor General of the Colony.
He explicitly accepts with great weight Trutch's comment in an 1870
letter where he wrote:
... the title of the Indians in the fee of the public lands, or
of any portion thereof, has never been acknowledged by
Government, but, on the contrary, is distinctly denied. 69
Chief Justice McEachern seemed to go to great lengths to 'save
face' for Trutch and goes out of his way to legitimize British Columbia's
history. What he fails to acknowledge are Mr. Trutch's true colours,
about which a comment by Robin Fisher, the Canadian historian, is
enlightening. Describing him as a man charged with the duties of
building roads and bridges, establishing townships, and developing the
region, Fisher on Mr. Trutch's character says:
... Trutch was very much a product of imperial England's
confidence in the superiority of her own civilization.
Other races came somewhat lower on the scale ofhuman
existence than the English, and the North American
Indian was barely part of the scale at all ... .In 1872 he
told the Prime Minister of Canada that British Columbia Indians were "utter savages" .... Trutch stereotyped
the Indians as lawless and violent, and was frequently
preoccupied with the need to suppress by a show of force.
Douglas, on the other hand, had argued 'that they should
in all respects be treated as rational beings, capable of
acting and thinking for themselves.70
Evidence from a person with such views must be questioned. In fact,
Chief Justice McEachern's entire fact-finding process is questionable.
The respect he showed for these three sources of evidence
(Brown, Loring, Trutch)71 because of their position in Canadian society
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was not similarly extended to the oral evidence presented by the
hereditary chiefs, who arguably held much more significant positions
within Gitksan society. In accepting all three of these sources, Chief
Justice McEachern deliberately turned a blind eye to the fact that they
too may have been based on "honestly held biases" and statements of
belief rather than fact. 72 These biases and beliefs were fatal to the
Gitksan evidence and consequently fatal to proving a system of property.
Ironically, the Chief Justice's entire decision in Delgamuukw is itself
built entirely upon "honestly held biases" and "statements of belief
rather than fact".
A last point regarding the acceptance of evidence of the type
mentioned above is that it was done despite acknowledgement by Chief
Justice McEachern that it was suspect. He stated that early settlers
were preoccupied with the task at hand and did not pay sufficient
attention to the real and potential sociological, cultural, and economic
difficulties the aboriginals were experiencing. 73 Further, if the courts
and society of today, nearly two centuries later, cannot fully understand
aboriginal peoples, how is it that early settlers can give such an accurate
account? Finally, Chief Justice McEachern admits that he wasn't persuaded that any of Brown, Trutch, and Loring spoke with a complete
understanding of the law or facts, but found no need to comment on their
bona fides. 74

D. Selective Choice of Jurisprudence
By choosing the province's submission of the Swiss writer,
Vattel, over that of the Spanish writer, Vitoria, adduced by the Gitksan,
the Chief Justice once again illustrated his Western view of the world
and bolstered his underlying assumption that Anglo-European civilization was superior. 75 He was quick to avoid Vitoria's views which were
quite contrary to those of Vattel. Namely, Vitoria rejected arguments
that "barbarians (aboriginals) could not hold land by reason of their sin
against Jesus, or unbelief in the Catholic faith, or their 'unsoundness of
mind'."76 Further, Vitoria declared that the aboriginals in question
were true owners both from a public and private law view.77

Selective Use and Misapplication of the Law
A. Overview
As with all litigation, there were three main components to the
Delgamuukw decision. First, there was the analysis of the evidence
produced which included admissability and weight. Second, there was
the application of the law (statute and precedent) to the evidence
adduced and facts established. The third and overriding component is
the interpretation of those two other components by the adjudicator. The
first has already been addressed above in conjunction with the third.
This section will discuss the second component and how it interacts with
the third.
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Once again, from the very outset of his discussion of the legal
authorities, Chief Justice McEachern makes an erroneous statement.
He says: "I do not propose to refer to very many case.s. This is because,
although this is an unique case, it is not one of first impression insofar
as many of its issues are concerned."78 Yet he continues to say that
applying the facts to these principles will inevitably lead him to new
questions not previously considered. 79
I suppose this illustrates Chief Justice McEachern's lack of
knowledge and misunderstanding of what is at issue in Delgamuukw.
Never before has a case like this been seen. Never has there been such
a vast amount of evidence presented to an adjudicator on such an issue.
And never before has it been done in the British Columbia context- one
which is unique in its history of the relationship between aboriginal
people and Anglo-Europeans. Not only did the Chief Justice throw most
of these unique characteristics out the window because of his judicial
bias and selective use of evidence, but also any uniqueness left was
nullified by selecting and misapplying legal precedent.

B. St. Catharines as Binding Authority?
Chief Justice McEachern relied almost exclusively on R. v. St.
Catharines Milling and Lumber Company,80 a Nineteenth Century
Privy Council decision, to reach his conclusion that the Gitksan aboriginal rights are non-proprietary. He says the antiquated St. Catharines
decision is:
... powerful authority, binding on me, that aboriginal
rights, arising by operation oflaw, are non-proprietary
rights of occupation for residence and aboriginal user
which are extinguishable at the pleasure of the Sovereign. 81
Having laid the groundwork described in the previous section,
namely, the ethnocentric and 'primitive' view of the Gitksan, Chief
Justice McEachern is able to rely on legal precedent such as this with
much greater ease. He continues to say:
I was also treated to extensive arguments about the
legal ingredients of ownership. Most of these authorities
were American cases which were decided in a totally
different legal and factual context from the situation in
British Columbia and they do not overcome the binding
authority of St. Catharine's [sic] Milling about the
nature of non-proprietary aboriginal interests. It seems
to me, with respect, that the Privy Council got it right
when it described the aboriginal interests as a personal
right rather than a proprietary one. 82
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1. Aversion to American Authority

Chief Justice McEachern's aversion to American case law in
deference to St. Catharines is further illustrated by the comment: "I...am
dubious about the usefulness ofAmerican authorities because they arose
in a historical context so different from this province."83 What he fails
to realize is that the Canadian authorities upon which he places so much
reliance, especially Calder,84 do themselves rely on American authorities. The Calder decision is significant in this respect because it was
dealing with a similar context to the Gitksan, the Nishga of Northern
British Columbia. Apparently, the Supreme Court of Canada saw the
American authorities as very applicable in British Columbia. Upon
viewing the Calder decision, it is apparent that both the majority
judgement of Mr. Justice Judson and the dissent of Mr. Justice Hall
relied extensively on such authorities. One must question why Chief
Justice McEachern indirectly relied on American authorities through
such cases as Calder, instead of relying on them directly. More to the
point, indirect use of such authorities by way of Canadian case law places
American authorities two steps removed from analysis. Hence, there is
no opportunity to independently assess these decisions on their merits
or how they may have affected the Canadian authorities relying upon
them.
2. Supreme Court of Canada Authority to the Contrary
In affording St. Catharines such weight, while at the same time
disregarding American case law, ChiefJustice McEachern erred in three
ways. First, the finding of the Chief Justice that Gitksan rights are nonproprietary is inconsistent with at least three Supreme Court of Canada
cases. The first is the Calder decision. This decision does not receive the
weight it deserves due to a split court (4:3), with the deciding judge doing
so on a peripheral issue. However, the judgement of Mr. Justice Hall for
the dissent is enlightening and persuasive in supporting proprietary
rights for the Gitksan. Through extensive use of American case law,85
Mr. Justice Hall seems to indicate that aborirnals have a legal as well
as a just claim to the territory they occupy.8
Calder also goes a long way to illustrate the error which Chief
Justice McEachern committed in Delgamuukw. In a very enlightening
passage regarding Mr. Justice Gould's decision in the British Columbia
Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Hall states:

"[In] an interesting and apt line of questions by Gould,
J., in which he endeavoured to relate Duff's evidence as
to Nishga concepts of ownership of real property to the
conventional
common
law
elements
of
ownership ... disclose that the trial Judge's consideration
of the real issue was inhibited by a preoccupation with
the traditional indicia of ownership. 87
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Mr. Justice Hall continues and quotes Lord Haldane inAmodu Tijani v.
Secretary, Southern Nigeria88 as saying:
There is a tendency, operating at times unconsciously, to
render that title [native] conceptually in terms which
are appropriate only to systems which have grown up
under English law. But this tendency has to be held in
check closely.89
Chief Justice McEachern's preoccupation with equating primitive people with non-proprietary interests as well as using common law
property terms to describe the Gitksan property system makes his
analysis suspect. A judge must have a flexible mind and be able to
acknowledge that there may be different systems of property which at
the end of the day operate under similar premises and result in a similar
state of affairs. By looking through a lens of the Western world and
focusing in on the 'primitive' culture, Chief Justice McEachern not only
committed the above mentioned errors, but lost sight of the fact that
possession itself is proof of ownership.
If the Chief Justice had not committed the above errors, the
burden of establishing that the Gitksan's rights have been extinguished
would have rested squarely on the province and the case would have
taken on a different face. It is arguably a lot more difficult to prove
extinguishment of a proprietary right than a non-proprietary right.90
The second and third Supreme Court of Canada decisions are
highlighted together by the words of a unanimous decision in Canadian
Pacific Ltd. v. Paul, where it was said:
Courts have generally taken as their starting point the
case of St. Catharine's [sic] Milling .. .in which Indian
title was described ... as a "personal and usufractuary
right". This has at times been interpreted as meaning
that Indian title is merely a personal right which cannot
be elevated to the status of a proprietary interest so as
to compete on an equal footing with other proprietary
interests. However, we are of the opinion that the right
was characterized as purely personal for the sole purpose of emphasizing its generally inalienable nature; it
could not be transferred, sold or surrendered to anyone
other than the Crown ... The inescapable conclusion from
the court's analysis [the Supreme Court of Canada in
previous cases] oflndian title up to this point is that the
Indian interest in land is truly sui generis. It is more
than the right to enjoyment and occupancy although, as
DicksonJ. pointed out in Guerin, it is difficult to describe
what more in traditional property law terminology.91
This statement by the Supreme Court of Canada, made only
three years before, casts doubt on the authority of St. Catharines and
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supports at least a finding that the Gitksan's rights were greater than
a personal right, as described by ChiefJustice McEachern inDelgamuukw.
3. True Meaning of St. Catharines
The second reason why Chief Justice McEachern should not
have weighed St. Catharines so heavily is because Lord Watson's
suggestion in that case that aboriginal rights depend "upon the good will
of the sovereign" does not necessarily suggest that these rights must
therefore be non-proprietary. As suggested by one writer, in that context,
everyone's rights exist at the pleasure of the sovereign.92
4. Relevance of the St. Catherines Context
The third reason for questioning the authority of St. Catherines is its
antiquity and the context in which it occurred. It is a case over a century
old, since which time much has transpired in the realm of understanding
aboriginal peoples and within the surrounding case law. Chief Justice
McEachern's belief that its principles are "too well established for me to
challenge or question at this date" is nonsense. 93 He has all the reason
to question them. Specifically, St. Catherines decided the aboriginal
rights issue as a side issue to the main issue of the case. Further, the
aboriginals whose rights were being decided were not even present to
argue the contrary.94 Chief Justice McEachern's reliance on this case
further illustrates his desire to allow only those ingredients to sift
through the screen which contribute to his final product that the Gitksan
have no proprietary rights in the territory.
Conclusion
The Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en turned to the courts as a last resort
to gain recognition of their long-asked-for ownership and authority over
their territory. It was not an easy decision to make, for by doing so they
were admitting that the issue could only be settled in the 'white-man's'
court. The irony of this is that even this last resort would not recognize
their rights. 95 More accurately, Chief Justice McEachern did not recognize them beyond personal, user rights. However, both fact and law
suggest that the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en are indeed entitled to proprietary rights. For example, though the Gitksan and Anglo-European
notions of property appear different, the effects of these notions on their
respective societies are similar.
ChiefJustice McEachern's underlying premise that the GitksanWet'suwet'en are 'primitive' peoples incapable of holding proprietary
interests disregarded such a possibility. By constructing a 'screen'
through which evidence and law could be sifted, the Chief Justice was
able to construct and support his 'primitive' people premise. Judicial bias
did not necessarily need to result in the findings made by Chief Justice
McEachern. Vast amounts of evidence was adduced, volumes of written
arguments produced, and years of oral argument given. In his position
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as judge, he could have, and should have, used this information to see the
'whole picture', but he failed to do so. As the Judicial Inquiry Committee
said:
True impartiality is not so much not holding views and
having opinions, but the capability to prevent them from
interfering with a willingness to entertain and act on
different points of view. Whether or not a judge [is]
biased . . . becomes less instructive an exercise than
whether or not the judge's decision or conduct reflected
an incajacity to hear and decide a case with an open
mind.9
Chief Justice McEachem had a narrow perspective when deciding Delgamuukw. Not only did he carry his preconceived views of
aboriginals into the court, he refused to truly listen and understand
contrary evidence adduced by the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en. Through the
selective use of evidence and law, the Chief Justice was able to conclude
that it is impossible for the 'primitive' Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en people to
hold proprietary rights. This conclusion is based on an erroneous
premise emerging from a faulty fact-finding process and misapplication
of precedent, which puts his entire analysis into question. 97 It is easy to
extinguish or lose by implication personal rights. Proprietary rights, on
the other hand, cannot be dismissed so easily. Given this, Chief Justice
McEachern's analysis would have been entirely different if proprietary
rights had been found to exist. Hopefully, this will receive the attention
of the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en counsel on appeal. 98 However, the paradox
of litigation looms. That is, as Delgamuukw climbs the judicial ladder,
the binding authority of the decision increases, while the ability of the
courts to fully understand and appreciate the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en
claim diminishes. Chief Justice McEachern had the opportunity to hear
the evidence in its true and real form. However, the appeal court will
have access only to the trial transcript- unless an exception is made.
Third year law student, Dalhousie University.
1. Though this paper has focused on how the 'primitive' premise and selective use of
evidence and law led to an erroneous finding that the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en do not hold
proprietary rights in their territory, there is an even greater tragedy in this decision. The
Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en came to the court as a last resort, yet did so with great respect. They
divulged and shared with the court the very essence of their people in addition to their
innermost feelings. In return, however, all they received was disrespect. The GitksanWet'suwet'en culture and society was trivialized and ignored, while at the same time they
were seen as 'primitive' peoples. This is the true tragedy of Delgamuukw, for though the
long-deserved recognition of the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en's true rights to their territory may
be forthcoming, these people have suffered irreparable harm at the hands of our judicial
system.I. Hereinafter, 'Gitksan' will mean 'Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en'.
2. An area covering 54,000 sq. km. (22,000 sq. miles) in central British Columbia- an area
the size of Nova Scotia.
3. "Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en Land Title Action" (1988] 1C.N.L.R.14 at 17. This article is a
reproduction of the Plaintiffs' opening statement.
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4. Delgamuukw, also known as Ken Muldoe, suing on his own behalf and on behalf of all
the members of the House ofDelgamuukw, and others v. Her Majesty in right ofthe Province
of British Columbia and the Attorney General of Canada [1991] 5 C.N.L.R. 1 (B.C.S.C.)
(hereinafter Delgamuukw ).
5. What he did find was that, subject to the general law of the province, the Gitksan have
a continuing legal right to use unoccupied or vacant Crown land for aboriginal subsistence
purposes- in essence, no greater rights than any other citizen of the province.
6. 'Psychologically' from the decision-makers' perspective. As will be seen later, this factor
assisted Chief Justice McEachern in reaching his decision.
7. The term 'screen' will be used periodically to refer to the sum of its components, which
will be discussed later.
8. The comments of the Gitksan view of the world may to a great extent apply to other
aboriginal peoples. However, due to the fact that each group of aboriginal people has its
own unique characteristics, I have not generalized. Further, these comments are taken
from supra, note 1.
9. Supra, note 3 at 24.
10. Ibid.
11. Leroy Little Bear, "Aboriginal Rights and the Canadian "Grundnorm"" in J. Rick
Ponting,"ed.,Arduous Journey: Canadian Indians and Decolonization (Toronto: McLelland
and Stewart Ltd. 1986) 243 at 244.
12. The very use of the words 'property', 'systems of property', and all other common law
property terminology is indicative of one of the problems in the issue being discussed in this
paper. As will be seen later, it is problematic to try to pigeon-hole aboriginal concepts of
'property' into foreign and common law categories.
13. Supra, note 12 at 249. See also at 244-257 for detailed discussion on the aboriginal/
British common law property dichotomy.
14. As will be discussed later this is just one point on which Chief Justice McEachern does
not believe the Gitksan. At supra note 4 at 14 he says "there is no evidence to support such
a theory and much good reason to doubt it."
15. A House is a matrilineage of people so closely related that its members usually know
their relations. Each House is identified by its crests, oral histories, and songs. These
represent something greater than history, title, and authority- they go to the very spiritual
power of each House, its daxgyet. See supra, note 3 at 26.
16. Supra, note 3 at 28.
17. Ibid.
18. This includes pole-raising, funeral, headstone, shame, potlatch, and other feasts.
19. Supra, note 3 at 28.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., at 32.
22. For a complete list of suggested equivalent areas, see supra, note 3 at 32-33. This paper
will not focus on a detailed analysis of the technical similarities, yet is operating on the
premise that there is sufficient evidentiary proof of such similarities.
23. M. Asch, "Errors in the Delgamuukw Judgement: An Anthropological Perspective"
(Paper delivered at Delgamuukw and the Aboriginal Land Question, Victoria, B.C., 10, 11
September 1991) at 6 [unpublished].
24. Ibid.
25. See Supra, note 24.
26. One writer has said with respect to any writing:

A discussion of values is sensitive to the influence of the writer's own
values .... I have tried to deal with the different positions in a spirit of
impartiality, but I warn the reader that the selection and emphasis of
different values and their consequences are value laden choices. The
criteria I develop by which to judge the various options reflect certain
values and not others .... some of(my readers) will, without doubt, reach
conclusions very different from my own.
See Mark Holmes, "The Funding of Private Schools in Ontario: Philosophy, Values and
Implications for Funding" in Report of the Commission on Private Schools in Ontario
(October 1985) at 112 (Commissioner: B.J. Shapiro). This quotation is not meant to
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rationalize Chief Justice McEachern's approach, but simply to highlight the implications
of a decision-maker's own values on his/her decision.
27. Canadian Who's Who, 1990, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) at 633.
28. Even if these were the views of society, which I suggest they are not, this would still
not make the approach acceptable, nor correct.
29. A. Derrick and C. Lazier, "Judicial Bias/The Role of the Judge inDelgamuukw" (Paper
delivered at Aboriginal Peoples and Canadian Law: An Exploration of the Land Claims
Made- Workshop on Delgamuukw v. The Queen, Halifax, N.S., 26, 27 October 1991)
[unpublished].
30 .. Louise Mandell, "Native Culture on Trial", in Sheilah L. Martin and Kathleen E.
Mahoney, eds., Equality and Judicial Neutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 358.
31. Nova Scotia, Department of the Attorney General, "Report of the Canadian Judicial
Council Inquiry Committee Established Pursuant to ss. 63(1) of the Judges Act at the
Request of the A-G of Nova Scotia" at 23 ofMcEachern C.J.'s report (August 1990); R. u.
Marshall (1983), 57 N.S.R. (2d) 286.
32. Supra, note 4 at 11.
33. Chief Justice McEachern was specifically asked by the hereditary chiefs in their
opening statement not to take this erroneous view of their people, supra note 3 at 23.
Incorrectness aside, the irrelevence of such a statement would have been obvious had the
ChiefJustice acknowledged that not too long in the past the Western World was in a similar
state.
34. Though I do not have access to the trial transcript, this can be inferred from the
Opening Statement, supra, note 3; the judgement itself, supra, note 4; and from Michael
Jackson, counsel for Gitksan.
Such a view is not unique to the Canadianjudiciary. In Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty.
Ltd. and Commonwealth of Australia, (1971), 17 F.L.R. 141 (S.C.,N.T.), the court was
presented with complex and extensive evidence on the aboriginees social rules and customs
to establish a legal proprietary right in the land. Like in Delgamuukw, despite persuasive
evidence to the contrary, Justice Blackburn concluded at 273:
In my opinion, ... there is so little resemblance between property, as our
law, or what I know of any other law, understands the term, and the
claim of the plaintiffs for their clans, that I must hold these claims are
not in the nature of proprietary interests.
35. (1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145 at 169 (SCC) [hereinafter Calder].
36. The four requirements are outlined in Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian
Affairs (1979), 107 D.L.R. (3d) 513 at 542 CF.C., T.D.) [hereinafter Baker Lake]. In
Delgamuukw, supra, note 4 at 212, Chief Justice McEachern says "I am satisfied that the
tests stated by Mahoney, J. accord generally with the authorities and I am content to adopt
them."
37. [1919] AC 211.
38. Supra, note 4at183, quoting Mr. Justice Mahoney inBaker Lake, supra, note 3 at 558559.
39. Supra, note 38 at 233-34.
40. Supra, note 24 at 20. Asch suggests further that these precedents combine to allow
for a finding that a society could be so primitive as to have no societal organization or law,
a state of affairs not realistic or possible.
41. Supra, note 4 at 213, quoting Mr. Justice Mahoney in Baker Lake, supra, note 36 at
559.
42. Ibid.
43. Supra, note 4. Further examples of this are: findingthat the Gitksan "roamed" (at 209)
over the land; they "[eked] out an aboriginal life" (at 41); and prior to contact, the Gitksan
have maintained "bare occupation [of the land] for the purposes of subsistence" (at 199).
44. See, for example, supra, note 4 at 38-39.
45. Supra, note 4 at 40.
46. Ibid., at 41.
47. Ibid., at 53.
48. Ibid.
49. L. Pynn, "Chiefs say court on their land" The Vancouver Sun (13 May 1987).
50. Ada'ox is the official sacred culture of a Gitksan House which in large part explains the
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state of the Gitksan institutions at any given point. The Wet'suwet'en equivalent is
kungax.
51. Anita Webster, "A Landmark Land Claim" (1988) 12:4 Can. Lawyer 28 at 29.
52. Ibid. This remark can be found in the actual trial transcript and further illustrates his
ethnocentrism and misunderstanding of the Gitksan.
53. Supra, note 4 at 41.
54. For example, Chief Mary Johnson asked before going forward with her song, "Is this
o.k. your highness?"- Michael Jackson, counsel for the Gitksan.
55. Ibid., at 40. One must ponder whose views are more 'romantic'-the Gitksan's in
speaking their way of life or the judiciary that rests its laurels upon such concepts as
'discovery', 'extinguishment', and this whole superiority ideology.
56. Ibid., at 41.
57. This is not at all to suggest that they should have.
58. Supra, note 4 at 43. For a discussion of the role of anthropologists in aboriginal land
claims, see supra, note 24 at 16-18 and D. Elias, "Rights and Research: The Role of the
Social Scientist in the Legal and Political Resolution of Land Claims and Questions of
Aboriginal Rights" [1989] 1 C.L.N.R. 1.
59. Ibid., at 42.
60. Supra, note 36 at 169; referring to Mr. Justice Gould in Calder v. A.G. of B.C. (1970),
8 D.L.R. (3d) 59 at 63 (B.C.S.C.).
61. (1991), 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385 CS.C.C.).
62. At numerous points in his decision, Chief Justice McEachern emphasizes the
importance of this attribute of evidence. Two issues come to mind. First, it could be argued
that since the Gitksan have made claims as far back as 1884, litigation has occurred in a
preliminary way ever since. Therefore, the historical records may themselves be open to
dispute. Second, given that the Gitksan way oflife is built upon the oral word, collecting
and writing oral data only becomes necessary upon litigation. Demanding such a requirement of the Gitksan evidence creates a no-win situation.
63. Supra, note 4 at 64.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid., at 65.
66. Ibid., at 200.
67. Ibid.,at 155.
68. Ibid., at 158-161.
69. Ibid., at 119.
70. Robin Fisher, "Joseph Trutch and Indian Land Policy" in J. Friesen and H.K. Ralston,
eds. Historical Essays on British Columbia (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1976)
257. It is significant that Douglas, who was mentioned by Fisher, had opposing views to
Trutch and, though there was no reason for his views to be disregarded, they carried no
weight in the decision. See supra, note 4 at 97-118, esp. 115. These early observers'
influence on Chief Justice McEachern is clearly apparent in his words: "the primitive
condition of the natives described by early observers is not impressive", supra, note 4 at 20.
71. It is interesting to note that although the Chief Justice acknowledges that there are
comments to the contrary, he chooses either not to quote them (supra note 4 at 168-169)
or gives them little weight.
72. As referred to earlier (supra, notes 54,59), these are Chief Justice McEachern's
comments on the anthropologists and oral witnesses, respectively.
73. Supra, note 4 at p.116. One must ask why bona fides is so irrelevant in the realm of
these witnesses, yet fundamental in assessing the Gitksan witnesses.
74. Ibid., at 169.
75. Ibid., at 68-69.
76. James Youngblood Henderson, "The Doctrine of Aboriginal Rights in Western Legal
Tradition", in Menno Boldt and J. Anthony Long, eds. The Quest for Justice: Aboriginal
Peoples and Aboriginal Rights. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) at 188.
77. For a more extensive discussion on this topic see generally ibid.
78. Supra, note 4 at 173. Note the previous discussion on the choice oflegal precedent to
perpetuate the 'primitive' premise. This section deals with the selection of precedent which
holds aboriginal interests to be non-proprietary.
79. Ibid, at 173,174.
80. (1885), 10 O.R. 196; Aff'd (1886) 13 Ont. App. R. 148; Aff'd (1886), 13 S.C.R. 577; Aff'd
(1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 (J.C.P.C.) [hereinafter St. Catharines].
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81. Supra, note 4 at 179.
82. Ibid., at 208, 209. It is significant that upon analysing St. Catharines at the Supreme
Court of Canada level, he agreed with the minority view of Mr. Justice Tashereau, rather
than the dissent of Mr. Justice Strong. It is the dissenting Mr. Justice Strong, at 175, 176
of Delgamuukw, who said quite clearly that aboriginal rights are proprietary.
83. Supra, note 4 at 174.
84. Supra, note 35.
85. Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh (1823), 8 Wheaton 543; Worcester v. State
of Georgia (1832), 6 Peters 515; United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co. (1941), 314 U.S.
339. All decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.
86. Supra, note 35 at 196.
87. Supra, note 60 for Mr. Justice Gould's decision. Mr. Justice Hall's quote is found at
supra note 36 at 187.
88. [1921] 2 AC 399 at 403.
89. Supra, note 35 at 187.
90. Though arguably given his overall approach in Delgamuukw, he would have found
an-0ther route to the same conclusion.
91. [1988] 2 SCR 654 at 677-678; Guerin v. The Queen (1984), 13 D.L.R. (4th) 321at339.
92. Hamar Foster, "It Goes Without Saying: Precedent and the Doctrine of Extinguishment by Implication in Delgamuukw et al. v. The Queen" (1991) 49:3 The Advocate 341 at
345.
93. Supra, note 4 at 179.
94. As one commentator has suggested, if aboriginal title is recognized as proprietary, then
these old cases may be defective since all parties in a proprietary dispute must be present.
They are necessary parties. See William B. Henderson, "Canadian Legal and Judicial
Philosophies on the Doctrine of Aboriginal Rights'', in Menno Boldt and J. Anthony Long,
eds. The Quest for Justice: Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal Rights (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1985) at 225.
95. This is not to suggest that if a different judge had sat, or on appeal, the same result
would have occurred. In fact, I would suggest it would be different- at least in the sense of
not possessing the blatant disrespect and bias in Chief Justice McEachern's decision and
not utilizing a 'primitive' people concept as an underlying premise.
96. Supra, note 31 at 26-27 of the report of Richard C.J., Laycraft C.J., Abella and
Bellamare.
97.
As George Erasmus, the then head of the Assembly of First Nations, said of
Delgamuukw: "Ifit can be proved that natives had a higher level of social organization, the
basis for the judge's ruling would collapse." The [Halifax] Chronicle-Herald, (28 March
1991) at A-9.
98. Michael Jackson, counsel for the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en has indicated this is likely to
be raised on appeal. (Address to Aboriginal Peoples Class, Halifax, N.S., 6 November 1991)
[unpublished].

